Abstract: This paper surveys the literature that uses endogenous candidacy models of electoral competition to explain the number of candidates and the extent of their polarization in elections held under the plurality rule. The plurality rule is the voting rule under which each voter votes for one candidate, and the candidate who gets the most votes is elected. We organize the di¤erent contributions to this literature into three families based on candidates'motivation to contest the election and on which part of the candidate set is endogenous. We argue that endogenous candidacy models o¤er both theoretical and empirical advantages over the standard Hotelling-Downs model. On the theoretical front, these models can provide a more satisfactory microfoundation for the emergence and/or stability of a two-party system under the plurality rule. On the empirical front, these models o¤er a better account of the stylized facts regarding the number of candidates and their polarization. We also point to shortcomings of these models and propose some directions for future research.
INTRODUCTION
Regularly held, and contested, elections are considered to be an essential characteristic of a well functioning democratic system. It is therefore unsurprising that electoral competition is an extensively studied aspect of the political process. In the political economy literature, which seeks to understand the e¤ect of political processes on economic policies, electoral competition is often used as a shorthand for politics -policies are assumed to emerge from elections rather than being chosen by a social planner. The most commonly used model of electoral competition, the Hotelling-Downs model, has become a standard feature of many textbooks. 2 This article provides an overview of some of the advances in modeling electoral competition that go beyond this standard textbook model. In particular, we will survey a class of models that can be termed "endogenous candidacy models" of electoral competition. We argue that these models provide a better account of the stylized facts of electoral competition and are also based on more satisfactory theoretical underpinnings. We will limit our analysis to plurality rule, single-seat elections. Another survey -Bol, Dellis and Oak (2016) -looks at the literature on comparative analysis of di¤erent electoral rules with endogenous candidacy, also for single-seat elections.
This article is organized as follows: the remainder of this section will review and critique the canonical Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition; in Section 2 we will present some stylized facts regarding the number and positions of political parties in elections across di¤erent countries; in Section 3 we will introduce a threeway classi…cation of the endogenous candidacy models and discuss them in turn; …nally, in Section 4, we will compare the insights o¤ered by three families of models and conclude by pointing out directions for future research in the …eld. 2 While there has been over time several variants of the Hotelling-Downs model in the literature, the original model can be attributed to Downs (1957) which took as a starting point the spatial competition model proposed by Hotelling (1929).
A Brief Overview of the Hotelling-Downs Model
In the canonical Hotelling-Downs model (see Calvert (1986) , Duggan (2006) or De Donder and Gallego (2016) for a complete description of the model and its assumptions) the set of feasible policies is represented as points on the left-to-right spectrum of a line. Two vote-maximizing candidates compete by choosing points on the line which represent the policies they commit to implementing if elected. Voters have ideal policy positions along di¤erent points on the line and are assumed to have distance preferences, i.e., a voter's utility decreases in the distance between her ideal policy and the implemented policy. An election is held under the plurality rule; each voter votes for one candidate, and the candidate winning the biggest share of votes is elected. The celebrated median voter theorem states that the equilibrium policy positions of the two candidates will be identical to the median voter's ideal policy. The simplicity and intuitive appeal of this result makes it one of the most popular concepts in political economy. As pointed out in Callander (2005;  page 1116): "This powerful result has provided the foundation for insight into many areas of political economy, including in ‡uential models on the size of government, the nature of redistributive policies, and the rate of economic growth."
However, there are some shortcomings of the Hotelling-Downs model and its prediction, the median voter theorem, which we shall brie ‡y discuss.
1. Mixed Empirical Evidence. The median voter theorem makes two sharp predictions, viz. that the two candidates will adopt the same policy position and this policy position will coincide with the median voter's ideal policy.
However, the empirical evidence does not support these predictions. Not only is there a divergence in the policy platforms vis-à-vis the median voter's position, the degree of divergence also varies across space and time (e.g., Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) and the evidence presented in Section 2). This …nding suggests the need for a richer model that incorporates factors left out of the canonical model. 3 We will discuss some further empirical evidence related to this point in the next section.
2. Non-robustness of Equilibrium Existence. The existence of pure-strategy equilibria in the canonical Hotelling-Downs model depends crucially on there being two candidates and one policy dimension. With more than two candidates the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium itself is not guaranteed.
Furthermore, when the policy space is multi-dimensional, pure-strategy equilibrium generically does not exist. This makes the Hotelling-Downs model a poor representation of elections that have more than two candidates or which are contested on more than one dimension.
A well known result, Duverger's law, which we discuss in the next section in detail, states that the polities using the plurality rule tend to have a two-party system. It might be tempting to argue, in light of Duverger's law, that the assumption of two parties is without much loss of generality in plurality rule elections. 4 We will take up this issue in the next subsection.
3. Lack of Satisfactory Micro-foundations. The Hotelling-Downs model takes the number of candidates as exogenously given, restricting them to two in the canonical case. But the decision to contest an election is obviously strategic and a more satisfactory approach needs to take into account the 3 The literature has adopted di¤erent approaches to generate candidate polarization in the Hotelling-Downs model. One approach, adopted by Downs himself, relaxes the assumption of full voter turnout, allowing for abstention due to alienation, viz. a citizen abstains from voting when candidates are located too far away from her ideal position (see Downs (1957) and, among the most recent contributions, Laussel, Le Breton and Xefteris (2016) and references therein).
Another approach relaxes the assumption of complete information. For example, Banks (1990) assumes voters are uncertain about the policy a candidate will implement if elected. Alternatively, Calvert (1985) considers a setting where candidates are policy-motivated and uncertain about the location of the median voter's ideal policy. A third approach relaxes the assumption of uni…ed policy-making, allowing for alternative forms of policy-making (see, among others, Austen- (Baron (1994) ). 4 For much of our discussion, we will be using the term candidate synonymously with the term political party. As such, much of the literature we discuss can be thought of as adopting a unitary actor model of political parties. In our concluding section we discuss the relevance of distinguishing between candidates and political parties.
incentives for candidates to enter/exit the electoral race. Dutta, Jackson 
STYLIZED FACTS ABOUT ELECTORAL COMPETITION UNDER PLURALITY RULE
In reviewing the models of electoral competition with endogenous candidacy we emphasize the ability of these models to account for the following two stylized facts. 1) Duverger's law: plurality rule elections tend to favor a two party system; 2) Polarization: the political parties/candidates, not just the fringe players but also the serious contenders, do not always adopt convergent policy platforms. The canonical Hotelling-Downs model sidesteps the …rst stylized fact by exogenously assuming two parties, whereas its prediction of convergence to the median voter policy is not supported in the data.
We discuss below, in some detail, each of these stylized facts and present some empirical evidence pertaining to each.
Duverger' s Law
In his seminal contribution (see Duverger (1954) ), Duverger identi…ed an empirical regularity of elections, namely, that the plurality rule tends to favor a two-party system. Riker (1982) has dubbed this empirical regularity Duverger's law.
In this section, we empirically examine the extent to which we observe two-party systems in countries that use plurality rule. A standard measure of the number of parties that is used in the political science literature is the E¤ective Number of Parties (hereafter EN P ; Laakso and Taagepera (1979)). The EN P is an adjusted measure of the number of parties that accounts for the relative strength of each party. The EN P in a given election is obtained by taking the inverse of the sum of squared vote shares of the participating parties (v i s). The precise formula is given by:
Thus, the EN P varies from 1 (when one party obtains all the votes) to I (when votes are equally split across all parties) where I is the number of parties participating in the election. The EN P corresponds to the inverse of the Her…ndahl-Hirschman index of concentration.
The ENP is the most commonly used indicator of party system fragmentation (Lijphart (1994); page 70, Cox (1997); page 29). 5 The indicator is used in most 5 Another, less common, indicator of party system fragmentation is the Second-First ratio. The Second-First ratio is obtained by dividing the vote share of second losing party with the vote share of the …rst losing party. In single-member district elections, the …rst losing party is the party that comes second in the district, and the second losing party is the party that comes third in the district. 6 The numbers presented in Tables 1 and 2 are based on our own calculations and data from the constituency-level election archive's dataset (Kollman et al. (2016) 
Polarization in Plurality Rule Elections
The median voter result, while being a sharp prediction of much convenience for tractable models of political economy, is not always supported by data. In Table 2 we present, for the same set of countries and time period as above, the average degree of polarization across elections. Polarization is a measure of how di¤erent the platforms of the competing parties are, along the left-right dimension.
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A party system is said to be heavily polarized if all the parties are located at the extremes. Polarization is said to be absent if all the parties are located at the center (Sartori (1976) ). In this paper, we use the index developed by Taylor and Herman (1971) , which is widely used in the empirical literature (e.g., Curini and Hino (2012), Dalton (2008) , Lachat (2008) , Lupu (2015) , or Matakos, Troumpounis, and Xefteris 7 We use manually coded data from the comparative manifesto dataset (Volkens et al. (2015) ).
In this dataset, each sentence is coded according to its theme, in particular, a left-wing theme scale. Thus, we have
where v i is party i's vote share and p i is the policy position of party i on the leftright policy spectrum with the center of gravity, denoted by p, which is obtained by the formula
According to this index, a party system has a polarization of zero when the parties (receiving votes) are all located at the center of gravity. By contrast, a party system has a polarization of 1 when two conditions are satis…ed: (1) all the parties are located at one of the two extremes, and (2) the left-wing and rightwing camps both have a vote share of 50%. The advantage of this index is that it accounts for parties'sizes. For example, systems in which two large parties are located at the two extremes would be considered as more polarized than systems in which large parties are located at the center but small parties are located at the two extremes. The above table shows that, on average, it is usual to see between 10% to 20% polarization (100% being complete polarization). This is a non-negligible degree of 8 Another index consists in taking the left-right distance between the two most distant parties.
However, this index is less common, as it does not account for parties' sizes (e.g., see Matakos,
Troumpounis and Xefteris (2016)).
polarization. 9 Across di¤erent elections that number can vary as well.
The canonical Hotelling-Downs model with its celebrated result, the median voter theorem, is unable to explain these two stylized facts. In light of this shortcoming, researchers have sought to develop a richer model that would explain these stylized facts. One approach is to endogenize candidacy. The next section discusses various models of endogenous candidacy and their success (or lack thereof)
in explaining the stylized facts discussed above.
MODELS WITH ENDOGENOUS CANDIDACY
We classify the models with endogenous candidacy into three families. The di¤erent families are classi…ed along two dimensions: 1) whether the candidates are Downsian or Partisan, and 2) whether the entire set of candidates or only a part of it is endogenous. The second dimension is rather self-explanatory.
The …rst dimension concerns the motivation of candidates to contest the election. A key assumption of the Hotelling-Downs model is the pure o¢ ce-motivation of candidates. In fact, candidates that are purely o¢ ce-motivated are referred to as Downsian candidates and the models assuming pure o¢ ce-motivation of the candidates are said to belong to the Downsian paradigm. Empirical evidence as well as common sense suggests that there is more than rents from o¢ ce that motivates individuals to pursue a career in politics. An alternative paradigm, the partisan paradigm, assumes that candidates are policy-motivated, i.e., they intrinsically care about the policy outcome (see, for instance, Wittman (1983) and Calvert (1985) ). Note that issue of the motivations of political candidates, like human motivations in any …eld, is a complex one. While highlighting the Downsian-partisan dichotomy we do not intend to suggest this is an exhaustive or exclusive categorization. The survey is intended to present the main strands of the existing literature, with focus on models that represent each paradigm in its canonical form. With this caveat in mind, Table 3 summarizes our classi…cation of models of electoral competition with endogenous candidacy. To the best of our knowledge, there is no model of electoral competition that …ts the "fourth family", i.e., one that uses the partisan paradigm to consider the threat of potential entry to established candidates. We can o¤er some conjectures for this lacuna in the literature.
In order to set up such a model one would need to make a modelling choice as to whether or not a candidate can credibly commit to any policy other than his most preferred one. In the case where policy commitment is not allowed, the model will One could, on the other hand, write down a model that assumes candidates can credibly commit to any policy, not just their ideal one. Such a model is potentially interesting and will have considerably complex strategic behavior. However, we conjecture that such a model might run into the same problem as the second family of models, viz. an equilibrium in pure strategies might not exist.
In our discussion of these models we will highlight the predictions they make on both the degree of polarization and the number of candidates running for election, and compare the models in terms of the intuition driving the results.
A Unifying Framework
We start by providing a simple spatial model of electoral competition that will serve as a unifying framework for all three families of models.
A community must elect a single policymaker to choose and implement policy.
The set of policy alternatives, X, is the closed unit interval [0; 1]. The community consists of a unit mass of voters, N . Each voter n 2 N has preferences over X that can be represented by a utility function u n (x) = jx x n j, where jx x n j is the distance between x and x n , and where x n 2 X is voter n's ideal policy.
with associated density function f . We assume F to be continuously di¤erentiable and strictly increasing on [0; 1], with F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1. We refer to m F 1 (1=2) as the median voter's ideal policy. To further simplify exposition, we assume f to be single-peaked and symmetric around m.
There is a …nite set, M, of M 2 (potential) candidates who must decide whether and/or at which position to contest the election. We denote (potential) candidate i's decision by e i 2 E i X [ f;g, where e i = ; if potential candidate i does not run for election, and e i = x 2 X if he runs for election at position x.
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Depending on the family of models, candidates are Downsians (families 1 and 2) or Partisans (family 3).
The policymaking process is modeled as a three stage game. In case no one runs for election, a default policy, x 0 , is implemented. To facilitate exposition, we follow Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and assume x 0 provides utility 1 to every potential candidate.
The solution concept is pure-strategy (subgame perfect) Nash equilibrium. 13 
Models with a Threat of Entry (and Entry Deterrence)
This family of models considers Downsian candidates who seek to maximize their vote shares or their probability of winning. Its de…ning attribute is the distinction it makes between two types of candidates: the established candidates and the 1 2 As we shall see below, the set of feasible choices, E i , varies from one family of models to another. In the …rst family, there are two types of candidates: the established candidates, for whom E i = X (i.e., each established candidate chooses a position on X); and a potential candidate,
for whom E i = X [ f;g (i.e., he chooses whether or not to enter the race and, if he enters, at which position on X). In the second family, E i = X [ f;g for every potential candidate. Finally, in the third family, E i = fx i ; ;g for every potential candidate (i.e., a potential candidate chooses between entering the race at his ideal policy x i or stay out of the race). 1 3 Since stage 1 is the only stage at which there are strategic interactions, we look for equilibria of the stage-1 game.
(potential) entrants. Speci…cally, the canonical model in this family considers an election with two established candidates, called L and R, who choose simultaneously their policy positions x i 2 E i = X for i = L; R, and are followed by one (potential) entrant, called E, who makes his candidacy decision x E 2 E E X [ f;g after having observed the positions adopted by the two established candidates.
The seminal papers in this family are Palfrey (1984) and Weber (1992).
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These papers consider settings in which the entrant always stands for election (formally, E E = X). The substantively di¤erent (to Hotelling-Downs) conclusion reached by these papers is that entry induces the two established candidates to assume divergent positions on either side of the median, i.e., x L < m < x R . These models are thus better able to capture the policy divergence observed in real-world political races. However, these models also exhibit the contentious feature that the entrant systematically enters, even though he is sure to lose the election. Each candidate i seeks to maximize his vote share. We denote by positions fx L ; x R g can be partitioned into three subsets:
, in which case the potential entrant does not enter.
I ( ) where max
exists and is bigger than , in which case the potential entrant enters and his (unique) best-response is well-de…ned.
does not exist and sup
, in which case the potential entrant enters but his best-response is not wellde…ned.
Based on this partition, Weber de…nes the payo¤ of established candidate i as
is the set of "-best responses that guarantee the entrant a vote share of or more, and
De…ne inf
, which is, roughly speaking, the smallest biggest vote share the entrant can get. Weber (1997) shows the following: while x L and x R are given by
2. an entry-accomodating equilibrium exists if and only if < . If < , x L and x R are such that x L < m < x R and
Furthermore, the potential entrant enters at x E = m and his vote share is such that 
Hotelling-Downs Models with Endogenous Candidacy
One criticism of the models discussed above, at least in their canonical form, is that they are stacked in favor of the Duvergerian prediction by assuming two established candidates. Put otherwise, these models can explain the stability of a two-party system, but not its emergence. The second family of models breaks this asymmetry of treatment between established and potential candidates, and investigates the emergence of a two-party system.
The canonical model in this family, due to Osborne (1993) , assumes a …nite number M 3 of potential Downsian candidates who choose, simultaneously and independently, whether and at which position to stand for election, i.e., e i 2 E i = X[f;g for each i 2 M = f1; 2; :::; M g. They make their candidacy decisions seeking to maximize their respective probability of winning, and enter the race only if they expect to be elected with a positive probability. 18 Thus, the key di¤erence with the previous family of models is the elimination of the distinction between established candidates and potential entrants; in other words, all potential candidates are now ex ante identical.
Osborne (1993) shows the following:
Proposition 2. We have that:
1. if M = 3, then for any distribution of voters' ideal policies, F , the game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
2. if M 4, then for almost any F , the game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. To understand the intuition underlying this result, observe that a potential candidate runs for election only if he anticipates to be elected with positive probability.
It follows that in equilibrium, assuming one exists, at least two candidates must be standing for election. 19 Furthermore, an equilibrium must be non-convergent, meaning not all standing candidates are located at the same position, with the leftmost and rightmost positions at which candidates are standing lying on either side of the median, i.e., x < m < x where x (resp. x) is the leftmost (resp. rightmost) position with a standing candidate. 20 In addition, the centripetal force of the 1 8 More precisely, Osborne (1993) assumes that a candidate prefers to win than tie for …rst place, prefers to tie for …rst place with another candidate than stay out of the race, and prefers to stay out of the race than enter the race and lose. 1 9 If nobody was running for election, then a candidate entering the race would be elected outright. If only one candidate was running for election, then a second candidate could enter at the same position and tie for …rst place. Hotelling-Downs model imposes that in equilibrium, two candidates are standing at x and two other candidates are standing at x. 21 These last two observations rule out existence of pure-strategy equilibria when M = 3. To understand why pure-strategy equilibria are non-generic when M 4, observe that there must be as many voters located on the left of x (resp. x) voting for a candidate at x (resp.
x) as there are voters located on the right of x (resp. x) voting for a candidate at x (resp. x). 22 Since the same must be true at any position with two standing candidates, for almost any distribution F there cannot be more than one standing candidate at each of the positions on the right of x, including x, which contradicts that there must be two candidates standing at x.
It is clear from proposition 2 that some additional structure is required for the (generic) existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium. To this end, Osborne (1993) subsequently alters the original model by considering a setting with an in…nite threat of entry as in the Palfrey-Weber models) can also produce pure-strategy equilibria with divergent policy positions. The authors add a second candidacy stage before the election, at which each candidate can decide whether to withdraw from the race and save some fraction of the entry cost. They show that the option of withdrawing from the race can generate a centrifugal force that leads candidates to polarize. Interestingly, it is the possibility of exit that can serve to deter potential candidates from deviating from their policy positions at the entry stage.
Feddersen, Sened and Wright (1990) studies a Downsian model of endogenous candidacy but, in contrast to all the papers previously discussed, assumes the voting behavior to be strategic rather than sincere. The authors show that an equilibrium always exists and has the entrants locating at the median voter's ideal policy. Thus we get, once again, the median voter result. Moreover, as was noted by the authors themselves, the result relies crucially on a potential candidate being deterred from entering at a non-median position by the (correct) anticipation that all the voters who prefer the median to the deviator's position will coordinate on one of the candidates standing at the median, thereby defeating the deviator. Thus, the result relies on an implausible assumption of a rather …ne degree of voter coordination.
To sum up, the Hotelling-Downs models with endogenous candidacy can, under suitable assumptions to ensure equilibrium existence, explain the emergence as well as the stability of a two-party system à la Duverger. This marks an improvement over the …rst family of models. However, these models get a mixed grade for explaining policy divergence. In particular, Duvergerian equilibria tend to be convergent, and non-convergent equilibria tend to be non-Duvergerian (Osborne (2000), and
Sengupta and Sengupta (2008) being the notable exceptions). The family of models we consider next has the potential to explain both stylized facts simultaneously.
In considering this family we will be moving away from the Downsian paradigm to the partisan paradigm.
The Citizen-candidate Models
In contrast to the two previous families of models, the third one, called citizencandidate models, considers potential candidates who are Partisans, i.e., who have preferences over the policy that will be implemented. Formally, this family of mod-els assumes that potential candidates are voters (M N ), 24 and, as all voters, have preferences over policy. The models in this family have been used for investigating several issues. These include the issues we focus on in this review, viz.
the number of candidates and the extent of polarization, but also other issues such as equilibrium (non) genericity, comparison of electoral systems, the e¢ ciency of policy outcomes, the e¤ects of lobbying or the identity of politicians (e.g., their policy preferences or their quality).
A canonical citizen-candidate model has three stages. In the …rst stage, potential candidates decide simultaneously and independently whether to become a candidate by incurring a candidacy cost > 0; candidates cannot commit to the policy they will implement once elected. In the second stage, an election is held over the set of candidates to decide the winner. In the third stage, the winner chooses and implements a policy. Since this is a one-shot election, and the winning candidate has a preferred policy, subgame perfection requires that he chooses his ideal policy.
This makes the third stage decision trivial, and it reduces the stage one decision to one about whether to run, but not which position at which to run. Formally, each potential candidate i 2 M makes candidacy decision e i 2 E i = fx i ; ;g, where x i is potential candidate i's ideal policy.
The two seminal contributions in this literature are Osborne and Slivinski (1996) , and Besley and Coate (1997). These contributions di¤er in two important ways. Osborne and Slivinski consider a unidimensional policy space and assume voting behavior to be sincere. Besley and Coate, on the other hand, allow the policy space to be multidimensional and assume voting behavior to be strategic. In order to facilitate a comparison with the canonical models of the two previous families, which assume sincere voting and a unidimensional policy space, we shall focus on the Osborne-Slivinski version of the citizen-candidate model. Also, to o¤er a sharp contrast with the two previous families of models, we shall consider the opposite polar case of purely policy-motivated candidates, i.e., candidates who care only about the policy outcome. 25 The equilibrium set can be partitioned into three subsets, with equilibria involving one, two and multiple candidates. 2 4 The other two families of models assume instead that the set of (potential) candidates is disjoint from the set of voters (M \ N = ;). 2 5 Note that the results we present below are robust to adding small rents from o¢ ce. < 1=3 and jx i mj.
3. Multi-candidate equilibria. There is no pure-strategy equilibrium with three or more candidates running for election.
In one-candidate equilibria, the candidate must be located at a position su¢ -ciently close to the median m so that no other potential candidate wants to enter the race. A candidate whose ideal policy lies further away from the median voter's ideal policy would be defeated and would not want to enter the race. A candidate whose ideal policy lies closer to the median (condition 1.a), being preferred by the median voter, would get a majority of votes, and be elected outright. A candidate whose ideal policy is as far away from the median (condition 1.b) would leave the median voter indi¤erent, and tie for …rst place. In the latter two cases, a second potential candidate is deterred from entering the race if his expected utility gain from implementing his ideal policy is smaller than the candidacy cost .
In two-candidate equilibria, each candidate must tie for …rst place, otherwise the losing candidate would be better o¤ not running since he would save the candidacy cost without changing the policy outcome. By the same logic, the two candidates must be standing at two di¤erent positions, otherwise one of them would be better o¤ not running; he would save the candidacy cost without changing the policy outcome. Given that the two candidates must be tying for …rst place while standing at two di¤erent positions, their ideal policies must be located symmetrically around the median so that they split equally the votes and tie for …rst place (condition 2.a).
In a two-candidate equilibrium neither of the two candidates should be better o¤ not running and no other potential candidate should want to enter the race. The former happens when the two candidates are su¢ ciently polarized, so that their expected utility gain from adopting their ideal policy exceeds the candidacy cost (condition 2.b). The latter happens when the two candidates are close enough to each other so that a potential candidate entering in-between would be defeated or would face a candidacy cost that exceeds his expected utility gain from being elected and adopting his ideal policy (condition 2.c). Observe that potential candidates with more extreme ideal policies are necessarily deterred from entering the race since they would split votes with the candidate on their side of the median, thereby triggering the outright election of the other, less preferred, candidate.
Pure-strategy equilibria with more than two candidates do not exist. 26 If a multi-candidate equilibrium were to exist, the leftmost candidate or the rightmost candidate (or both) would be better o¤ not running since his votes would then go to the candidate(s) located closest to him. This vote transfer would improve the electoral prospects of the latter candidate(s) while worsening the electoral prospects of the other candidates. This rules out the existence of pure-strategy equilibria with three or more candidates running for election.
To sum up, the canonical citizen-candidate model is capable of simultaneously generating the emergence of a Duvergerian two-candidate race as well as divergence away from the median, m. 27 Moreover, the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is not an issue in this family of models, even beyond the one-dimensional policy space. Another strength of the citizen-candidate models is their ability to explain the existence of spoiler candidates. These are candidates who run to spoil the election prospects of another candidate even though they do not stand a chance to 2 6 This result holds as long as the rents from o¢ ce are not too large and the potential candidates are either risk neutral or risk averse. win.
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While citizen-candidate models avoid the problem of equilibrium non-genericity, they typically su¤er from the opposite problem of equilibrium multiplicity. (2004)).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the previous section we discussed three families of endogenous candidacy models of elections under plurality rule. We argued that the need for these models arose due to both theoretical and empirical shortcomings of the Hotelling-Downs model. In particular, we discussed the need to explain two stylized facts: 1) the emergence and stability of the two-party system under plurality rule, 2) the existence of polarization (sometimes substantial) in the policy positions of the contending candidates. We found that there exist models in each family that could explain the above stylized facts, but di¤erent models generate these results through di¤er-ent channels. We will now provide a comparative perspective on these di¤erences across models. 2 8 Equilibria with spoiler candidates are non-Duvergerian and divergent, meaning they involve more than two candidates standing at di¤erent positions. In addition, these equilibria require strong o¢ ce-motivation on the part of the candidates such that the leftmost candidate or the rightmost candidate does not have an incentive to deviate and stay out of the race in an attempt at improving the electoral prospects of his neighboring candidate. 2 9 In this survey, we have considered the Osborne-Slivinski variant of the citizen-candidate model.
The other variant, studied in Besley and Coate (1997) , is also capable of generating two-candidate equilibria with positions diverging from the median as well as equilibria with spoiler candidates.
A Comparative Analysis of the Three Families
We start with the issue of polarization. In the Palfrey-Weber models, the established candidates face two con ‡icting forces. With the established candidates located on the two sides of the median, each can gain by moving closer to the median-this is the centripetal force. However, if one candidate, say the leftist, were to move too close to the median, he would invite the new entrant to enter at a position slightly left of him. This threat generates the centrifugal force. The equilibrium is obtained at locations where the two forces, the centripetal force and the centrifugal force, are in balance; such a point has both candidates locating at positions that are divergent from the median. By contrast, the citizen-candidate model does not have the centripetal or centrifugal forces, since the candidates are immobile. In this family of models, the polarized positions occur because of the mutually reinforcing presence of a pair of candidates-the presence of, say, the leftist candidate on the opposite side makes the rightist candidate not want to quit the race because doing so will mean a loss in utility due to a distant policy being implemented. This insight also sheds light on why the citizen-candidate models su¤er from a multiplicity of equilibria, each created by mutually reinforcing incentives for each candidate generated by the presence of the opposite side's candidate.
On the other hand, the second family of models are not particularly successful in generating polarized equilibria.
Contrasting the Downsian paradigm of the …rst two families with the partisan paradigm of the third, we can see the role played by policy commitment in driving the convergence result. Polarization arises in citizen-candidate models because of the inability of candidates to commit to policies, which eliminates the centripetal force that would induce two candidates on either side of the median to converge.
The role of policy commitment in generating polarization is con…rmed in Dellis and Oak (2007), and Brusco and Roy (2011) . These two contributions allow each candidate to commit to policies, speci…cally, any policy in Dellis and Oak (2007) and only policies that are " close to their ideal policy in Brusco and Roy (2011) .
In this context, all pure-strategy equilibria are one-candidate equilibria which, for a low candidacy cost, involve a candidate at the median running unopposed.
Secondly, all three types of models can generate Duvergerian outcomes. However on this front, the …rst family, i.e., the Palfrey-Weber models, are not par-ticularly satisfactory because, in their canonical form, they assume the presence of two established candidates. Thus, while these models can succeed in showing the stability of a two-party system, they do not consider its emergence. However, there also exist entry-accommodating equilibria, i.e., equilibria with more than two candidates. These equilibria are a mixed bag. On the one hand, they could be bought as showing the presence of spoiler candidates, an empirically documented phenomenon. However, on the other hand, this result is driven by the vote share maximization assumption. Moreover, with a few exceptions discussed earlier, the third candidate enters at the center, rather than at the ‡anks of the established candidates, which does not match the stylized facts since sometimes new parties enter on the extremes as well. In the second family of models, with the exception of Osborne (2000) and Sengupta and Sengupta (2008) , Duvergerian equilibria are also convergent. The existence of polarized, Duvergerian equilibria arises rather naturally in the citizen-candidate models. Moreover, unlike the …rst family, the emergence of this outcome is entirely endogenous. One important insight provided by these models is that Duverger's law need not arise due to the wasting-the-vote e¤ect as argued by Duverger but it can also arise due to strategic behavior of endogenous candidates. However, as Cox (1997) pointed out, the argument based on strategic candidacy exhibits several of the same limitations as the argument based on the wasting-the-vote e¤ect, viz. the requirement of a rather …ne degree of coordination among players (potential candidates or voters) and the assumption that players are concerned with the current election, but not with future elections.
Other Avenues of Research: Current and Future
The endogenous candidacy models open up avenues for addressing other questions that naturally arise once we treat candidates as endogenous. We did not cover some of these in our survey while others are in their nascent stage and are worthy of future research.
One issue, analyzed in a related survey paper (Bol, Dellis and Oak (2016) ), is that of comparative properties of alternative voting rules. In particular, the citizen-candidate model has been used to compare the extent of polarization that occurs across di¤erent electoral rules. For instance, di¤erent voting rules can be shown to a¤ect the identity of candidates and have an e¤ect on the policy outcome even when the equilibrium has only two candidates running in the election. This illustrates the strength of the endogenous candidacy approach, since a model with two exogenously given candidates will not be able to distinguish between most electoral rules in this situation, as they will be equivalent; see for instance, Dellis and Oak (2006, 2007, 2016 ), Dellis (2009), Dellis, Gauthier-Belzile and Oak (2016).
As discussed earlier, the importance of endogenizing candidacy when comparing the properties of electoral systems was forcefully raised in Dutta, Jackson and Le
Breton (2001).
Similarly, there is a small literature studying the e¤ect of the "district magnitude" (i.e., single vs. multiple seat districts) when candidacy is endogenous. For an early contribution in this area see Greenberg and Shepsle (1987) . Indeed, this line of inquiry promises to o¤er a comprehensive "mechanism design" approach to electoral systems where both aspects of the ballot, the voting rule as well as district magnitude, may be varied and the resulting equilibria compared using, for example, the citizen-candidate framework. In Finally, one issue deserving further attention is one of the formation of political parties. In the literature reviewed in this survey, there was essentially no distinction between a party and a candidate. However, much of the political science literature, going back to the work of Duverger, looks seriously at the formation and evolution of political parties and issues surrounding them. These issues include how parties are formed, how their internal functioning a¤ects selection of policies and candidates. Also, the existence of political parties creates reputational concerns both across time and constituencies. Hence, a more satisfactory treatment of political parties is required for building more satisfactory models of political competition. or parties acting as cost-sharing organizations, allowing the candidacy cost to be shared between party members (e.g., Riviere (1999)). We believe that this is a key area of research which deserves further study.
